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Despite being an improvement on 
the ad hoc and restrictive Fiscal 
Responsibility and Budget 
Management framework, the 
N K Singh Committee report 
suffers from some shortcomings. 
A short critique of the report’s 
framing is presented, suggesting 
that the report is insuffi ciently 
attentive to the considerations of 
macroeconomic coordination. 
There is a case for increased 
fi scal spending that runs counter
to the recommendations of 
the committee.
Fiscal defi cits are back in the news. After several years, questions are being posed about the correct pos-
ture towards government expenditure. 
In March 2016, a committee of distin-
guished public servants reviewed the 
framework of the Fiscal Responsibility 
and Budget Management (FRBM) Act, 13 
years after it was launched. The purpose 
was to think about the act and to frame 
new rules as a result. The N K Singh 
Committee report (FRBM–RC 2017) re-
ceived little attention, coming as it did 
on the heels of the demonetisation de-
cree two months earlier, and would cer-
tainly have commanded more notice in 
another time. It has nevertheless come 
back into public prominence in the 
 recent past, given the discussion of fi scal 
stimulus being considered by the cur-
rent government. There has been a near 
universal sense of panic about this im-
pending change in stance in the business 
papers (see, for example, Chakravarty 
2017) and many point to the N K Singh 
report as being a guide for this discussion. 
This, despite several news items that 
point to a serious slowdown in the econ-
omy. Here, a short critique of the report’s 
framing is presented. It is suggested that, 
at this juncture, there is indeed a case 
for fi scal spending that runs counter to 
the recommendations of the committee.
Perhaps, the most appealing aspect of 
the report is its suggestion to repeal the 
FRBM Act. On this, it is on fi rm ground. 
There is now, by and large an under-
standing that an ad hoc reduction of the 
fi scal defi cit to 3% of gross domestic 
product (GDP) has no reasoned argu-
ment behind it and cannot really be fol-
lowed when there are exigencies such as 
those that occurred during the global 
 fi nancial crisis. Having noted this, the 
committee suggests its own set of poli-
cies that are problematic.
Conceptual Shortcomings 
First, the report suggests long-term poli-
cy rules without any reasoned intrinsic 
notion of debt sustainability, resulting in 
an ad hoc framework. Second, the rec-
ommendations of the report are built on 
quicksand; they suggest a target that 
cannot be easily achieved using the in-
strument it chooses. Third, the analysis 
of the committee is silent on the fact that 
the variables that underlie much of the 
analysis (the fi scal balance and interest 
rates) must jointly be determined by 
macroeconomic concerns of achieving 
full employment and price stability, and 
that focusing on such variables in the 
service of debt management alone will 
lead to macroeconomic feedback effects 
that may not be planned.1 Here, I make 
the case—even on its own terms, and 
 especially given the current macro-
economic situation in October 2017—for 
more expansionary fi scal policy.
In this article, I do not focus on the 
(mild) controversy around whether to 
favour primary defi cit, revenue defi cit or 
the level of debt–GDP as a policy rule. Al-
though this discussion was the most 
commented on, all the recommenda-
tions went in favour of reducing spend-
ing, with little or no clarity as to why 
this was the default setting given the 
many reasons why increasing spending 
may be desirable at the current juncture. 
Neither do I address the useful discus-
sion of the state-level defi cits that take 
up a substantial part of the report.
The fact that the main thrust of the 
 report is towards consolidation suggests 
that despite the care that went into the 
report, the recommendations of the 
committee refl ect a perhaps unconscious 
commitment to a particular viewpoint—
that of the bondholder, and even more 
so, the view of standard international fi -
nance—and takes at best a partial view 
of the issues that ought to be considered. 
Things can only go in one direction when 
a report begins with discussions of a 
“responsible” government, in which 
 responsibility is limited to its payment 
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obligations rather than to the needs of the 
citizenry. Despite some gestures made to 
the many ways in which government in-
vestment may be currently useful, these 
are forgotten in what follows thereafter. 
Instead, the report warns about “fi scal 
adventurism” and its discontents, and 
the need to be “prudent,” none of which 
is objectionable, but only if viewed pri-
marily from the lender’s perspective.
Debt as Target 
The main recommendation of the com-
mittee is that government debt should 
be a target, set at 60% of GDP by 2023.2 It 
suggests repealing the existing FRBM 
Act, 2003 and the FRBM Rules, 2004 and 
enacting a new Debt and Fiscal Respon-
sibility Act in its stead to achieve this. The 
operational element here is the fi scal 
defi cit that will be adjusted to reach that 
level. Several reasons are given for adopt-
ing a debt anchor but are, on refl ection, 
not completely coherent or convincing. 
The committee suggests that in the 
21st century “debt is the new anchor” 
(FRBM–RC 2017: 6) and goes on to say that 
“‘debt’, and ‘debt repayments’ are con-
cepts that can be communicated easily 
to the public, and are also embedded in 
the psyche of the ordinary citizen.” It is 
not clear why this level needs to be com-
municated to the public as an anchor at 
all. There is no macroeconomic reason-
ing in which debt levels need to be com-
municated for stabilisation of any sort. 
With infl ation targeting there is an an-
choring to wage demands. Communica-
tion only matters insofar as beliefs about 
the target variable directly infl uence be-
haviour and while that is true about in-
fl ation, there is no reason to think it is for 
long-run debt trajectory. In what ways is 
an announced debt ratio supposed to set 
expectations, considering that it is a 
function of the defi cit, infl ation, the 
nominal interest rate, and growth, three 
of which are not under the direct control 
of the fi sc? What are the public at large 
supposed to do with this kind of infor-
mation about previously announced debt 
ratios? How are they supposed to react 
to it if, say, infl ation reduces and the debt 
ratio is breached? Are they to demand 
more infl ation, less spending, a reduc-
tion in interest rates? The behavioural 
assumptions are simply 
not reasoned through.
A second reason given 
is that debt can nega-
tively affect growth. It 
seems strange to have 
to relitigate the debates 
in the United States (US) 
and Europe surrounding the relation-
ship between debt and growth that con-
sumed the early part of the decade at this 
late juncture. Suffi ce it to say that the 
view that a debt level that caused growth 
slowdowns could be identifi ed economet-
rically as the infamous Reinhart–Rogoff 
paper (2010) attempted to do, has been 
thoroughly debunked. We have enough 
evidence that earlier studies had serious 
problems of reverse causality (see Ash et al 
2017, for a conclusive statement) and that 
there is no evidence that higher debt 
levels causally affect growth negatively 
(even in the Reinhart–Rogoff paper, the 
“dangerous” debt ratio level was at 90%). 
The committee makes some half-
hearted regression-based attempts at 
showing that debt becomes dangerous 
for growth at a break point of around 
40%–60% of GDP. I say half-hearted ad-
visedly. In Arvind Subramanian’s useful 
dissent (FRBM–RC 2017: Annex V), he notes, 
quite correctly, that the period of the highest 
growth in India (the mid-2000s) was 
also exactly the same period in which this 
limit was breached substantially (Figure 1), 
and that there is no evidence in support 
of a danger limit for debt, so it seems that 
this line of argument does not command 
consent even within the committee.3
Another motivation appears to be a 
concern with what might be called “being 
taken seriously” in an international con-
text. In the committee’s estimation, India 
does not do “as well” as its comparators 
in levels of government debt, where low 
levels of debt are taken to mean “better.” 
But when one looks at the trends, it is 
apparent that in some countries, debt 
ratios have been rising. For example, 
China has seen a doubling of public 
debt from 2000 to now, while for India, 
it has fallen slightly over the same time 
period. 
The bid for seriousness continues to 
be quixotically pursued when a claim is 
made for being below 60%–65% of debt 
to GDP ratio so as to remain in the Insti-
tutional Investor Rating (IIR) of “inter-
mittent high” range. But as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) itself notes:
In our view, as roll-over risks in India are 
somewhat mitigated by long average maturi-
ties and limited exposure to non- residents, 
these considerations improve the country’s 
attractiveness for investors. (IMF 2017: 15)
There is no reason to believe that a target 
of 60% debt to GDP ratio is necessary for 
being attractive to investors.
It is puzzling why the committee is as 
concerned with the level of government 
debt to GDP ratios currently (and as a result 
are almost universally in favour of reduc-
ing spending going forth). As Figure 1 
shows, government debt has fl uctuated 
between 60% and 85% of GDP for nearly 
25 years. It is near its historical lows 
since 1990 at the current juncture (only 
two years have been lower). More over, 
in this period of growth, the fastest in 
India’s independent history, debt ratios 
have never been at the rate suggested by 
the committee (60%).
Moreover, most debt is rupee denomi-
nated, and there is a substantial amount of 
debt held by the banking sector through 
regulation. There is only a small fraction 
of debt that is held externally. The Depart-
ment of Economic Affairs  reports that 
Indian sovereign debt was $93.4 billion in 
2016, while total debt was on the order 
of $1,569 billion.4 This suggests that only 
6% of debt is held  externally and so there 
is no real sense of facing a hard currency 
constraint in this regard.
Not only is this the case, it is also clear 
that since 2007, there has been a substan-
tial reduction in the central government 
defi cits, with defi cits now in the 3%–4% 
range and primary defi cits in the 1% 
range. Why then is there a need for moving 
to a debt ratio that has never been reached 
for over 25 years, a period in which India 
has undergone its fastest period of growth? 
Certainly, this cannot be because of 
Figure 1: Debt to Gross Domestic Product Ratio (%)
Chart Title
Source: International Monetary Fund.
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some pre-existing externally reasoned 
choice for debt sustainability.
At some level, there is reason to be 
sympathetic to the committee. Sustaina-
bility of debt is a somewhat ill-defi ned 
concept, especially in the context of 
 government debt that does not have a 
hard currency constraint. The academic 
literature is of little help in this regard. 
The No Ponzi game and Transversality 
conditions that are supposed to bind to 
maintain sustainability are of no practi-
cal guidance5 and are regularly violated 
in the real world (Azizi et al 2012).6 
An incomplete list of what may be 
considered sustainable depends on myriad 
factors, including (i) whether debt is held 
domestically or abroad; (ii) whether 
there are capital controls; (iii) whether 
the debt is denominated in local cur-
rency or dollars; (iv) the state of the 
economy (whether the private sector is in 
retrenchment); (v) the political economy 
of central banking (will the central bank 
purchase large amounts of government 
debt); (vi) the probability of externally 
generated macroeconomic instability, 
and so on. 
The question of whether debt is sus-
tainable in that sense is one that is highly 
contingent. To ward off the obvious 
response, let me state here that it is not 
that there are no constraints whatsoever 
to rising public debt, but the fi rst and 
most natural limitation is almost always 
an infl ationary constraint rather than a 
solvency one in countries such as India 
that have local denominated debt.7 One 
could just as well, and perhaps with more 
confi dence, defi ne fi scal policy actions 
based on its effects on concrete macro-
economic variables such as infl ation or 
employment/output rather than an arbi-
trary consideration of non-tangible ideas 
such as “confi dence,” which are far less 
meaningful as a basis to determine policy.
In the face of the contingent nature of 
sustainability debt, the committee has 
responded by valorising an ad hoc num-
ber, almost exactly like that in the FRBM. 
While the FRBM was ad hoc, too low, and 
the 3% target was never reached, it had 
the virtue of being something that could 
be targeted concretely. As the report’s 
authors are clearly aware, debt dynam-
ics depend on four factors, only one of 
which is in the control of the fi sc. It is to 
this question I now turn.
Debt Dynamics and the 
Implications of the 60% Rule
In the discussion of fi scal policy, the 
committee rightly focuses extensively 
on the accounting relationships involved 
that determine the evolution of public 
debt over time. 
We can formalise this discussion rea-
sonably easily. Purely from an accounting 
viewpoint, what has been the “least con-
troversial equation in macroeconomic” 
(Hall and Sargent 2011) states that the 
debt ratio in each period is equal to the 
ratio in the previous period, increased 
by rate of interest, and decreased by the 
rate of growth of GDP, plus the previous 
period’s primary defi cit. If we let b be 
the government debt ratio and d the 
primary defi cit to GDP, i be the interest 
rate on government borrowing and g the 
growth rate of GDP. The equation can be 
written as: 
bt+1 = dt + 
1+i( 1–g ) bt   ...(1)
The law of motion can be written as:
bt+1–bt=dt+1 
i–g( 1+g )bt  dt+(i–g)bt ...(2)
Equation (2) provides the main reason 
for the concerns of the committee. They 
note that while d, the primary defi cit, has 
been positive over the last decade or so, i, 
the interest rate has been lower than g, 
the growth rate, so that (i-g)b is negative, 
and thus, despite increased borrowing, 
the debt ratio has tended to fall. In other 
words, the main concern is that favourable 
debt dynamics, understood as the impact 
of the difference between the rate of 
interest and the rate of growth have 
hidden government profl igacy thus far and 
cannot be expected to do so later. The 
committee worries that the fact that i<g 
could reverse and points to the recent 
narrowing of the gap between the two 
as a sign of potentially a reversion to a 
“natural” situation where i>g. They note, 
not incorrectly, that all mainstream 
growth models suggest that i>g in the 
long-run. But as Delong (2015) notes, 
many countries, including the US, have 
somehow stubbornly disregarded the 
diktats of the long-run model prediction 
for the last 125 years! 
Even in India, there have been periods 
where the interest rate has been higher 
than the growth rate, and substantial 
periods more recently, in which interest 
rates have been lower than the growth 
rate. Going forward, which one is likely 
to persist? I imagine that it would be the 
latter. India is not the country of 20 years 
ago where there was a severe lack of credit 
availability and underdeveloped fi nan-
cial markets resulting in relatively high 
interest rates. Growth is high, and despite 
the recent downturn, there is no reason 
with the demographics that the country 
has and the potential for expansion that 
growth cannot continue at the current 
rates or more. Furthermore, with infl a-
tion attenuating, there is no reason to 
believe that interest rates should not be 
reduced in the coming few years. 
While projections are always to be 
taken with a large pinch of salt, recent 
projections from the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), IMF, and others have India grow-
ing at the 7%–8% range for the next few 
years, while projections of interest rates 
around 2020 are at around 4%–5%. The 
committee’s own scenarios use nominal 
GDP growth of 11.5% and interest rates on 
central government debt between 7.3% 
and 7.8% (FRBM–RC 2017: 57). Either way, 
the broad consensus is for a differential 
of around 3%–4% bet ween growth and 
interest rates over the next few years, a 
point I discuss soon. The Arvind Subra-
manian dissent note is clear that he ex-
pects the (g-r) differential to remain in 
place for some time. As he puts it, “Both 
theory and evidence show that a highly 
positive [g-r]—economic growth exceed-
ing interest rates—is a feature of emerg-
ing markets” (FRBM–RC 2017: 166). 
If we are interested in the debt–GDP 
ratio converging to some stable level 
what should occur with regard to the 
other variables? We can answer this 
question by setting the left-hand side of 
the equation (2) to zero. That gives us:
b  –d 1( i–g )  = d 
1( g–i )   …(3)
Clearly if g > i, as currently and in the 
projections, then to maintain a stable debt 
ratio, there is a corresponding stable 
level of defi cit. If, conversely, the situa-
tion which the committee fears comes to 
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pass and there is the situation where g < i, 
then maintaining a constant debt requires 
a primary surplus.8
Here then is the key diffi culty: the rec-
ommendation to reach and maintain a 
particular level of debt–GDP is opera-
tionally fraught, and will require fi sc to 
constantly adjust its targeted primary 
defi cit ratio, d, in reaction to variables 
that are completely out of the control of 
the fi scal authorities. If one is serious 
about targeting debt while allowing 
monetary policy to be fl exible, this will 
mean that the fi scal authority is a pas-
sive respondent to monetary policy and 
we will have created a situation which 
could rightly be termed “monetary dom-
inance.” Moreover, if the case arises 
when g<i, maintaining a stable debt ratio 
will be very diffi cult. In this sense, the 
proposal is entirely built on quicksand.9 
Arvind Subramanian, in his dissent, 
notes further that the framework is prob-
lematic “because multiple targets force 
policymakers to aim at too many, poten-
tially inconsistent objectives and analyt-
ical frameworks” (FRBM –RC 2017: 163).
One more point bears noting. As long 
as the debt ratio is above the target debt 
ratio, the rule will guarantee that fi scal 
policy is pro-cyclical.10 To see why, con-
sider the situation in which there is a 
negative shock (say from an export col-
lapse) to the economy that reduces 
growth. From equation (2), it is evident 
that this will have the effect of raising the 
debt ratio, necessitating a reduction in 
the primary defi cit further. While there 
are “escape clauses” in the recommen-
dations, it is not clear when these can 
come into effect and every negative shock 
that does not meet the criterion will 
result in a pro-cyclical defi cit. Since the 
upper bound on debt at 60% is all that is 
relevant (the report appears happy to 
have debt fall all the way to zero), this is 
the more important pro-cyclical effect. 
If, however, the government wanted a 
lower bound, then as long as the debt 
level was lower than this bound, any 
positive growth would have very low im-
pact on the overall debt and government 
would increase spending with the cycle.
This simple accounting shows some-
thing that is also obvious, but this is 
completely ignored by the committee. 
Debt ratios are dependent on both fi scal 
and monetary policy, on both the defi cit 
and the interest rate. Having a debt ratio 
target requires coordination between 
the fi scal and monetary authorities. In 
general, the interest rate and the fi scal 
balance can be thought of as two inde-
pendent instruments to be assigned to 
two targets, the path of output and the 
path of public debt. Mason and Jayadev 
(2017) show under general assumptions 
that the same unique combination of 
 interest rate and fi scal balance will be con-
sistent with output at potential and a con-
stant debt–GDP ratio regardless of which 
instrument is assigned to which target. 
In other words, while typically, the fi s-
cal authority is constrained to target a 
level of debt and the monetary authority 
target the level of output consistent with 
price stability (what Simon Wren-Lewis 
calls the “consensus assignment” [Ki-
rasanova et al 2009]), these could be re-
versed, with the fi scal authority target-
ing output and the monetary authority 
targeting debt. Moreover, Mason and 
Jayadev (2017) show that at low levels of 
debt, both assignment rules converge to 
the targets, but at high levels of debt, the 
consensus rule (favoured implicitly by 
the committee) fails to converge and it is 
better to let the monetary authority  target 
debt. Contrary to conventional wisdom, 
therefore, the case for countercyclical 
expansionary fi scal policy becomes strong-
er, not weaker, when the ratio of public 
debt to GDP is already high. 
It should be noted that this viewpoint is 
increasingly supported by policymakers 
elsewhere. In an important article, Jason 
Furman, the head of the Obama Council 
of Economic Advisors argued as follows: 
The fact that different models fi nd similar 
results suggests that the idea that fi scal expan-
sion can improve fi scal sustainability is worth 
taking seriously. And at the very least the real 
cost of fi scal stimulus is less than the headline 
numbers would suggest. In some respects, 
this argument may be even more important 
in high-debt economies like Japan and Italy. 
This is because changes in the debt-to-GDP 
ratio depend on two factors: (i) the difference 
between interest rates and the growth rate 
(strictly speaking, r minus g multiplied by 
the debt-to-GDP ratio) and (ii) the primary 
balance (the difference between revenue 
and non-interest spending). The larger the 
debt is, the more changes in r–g dwarf the 
primary balance in the determination of 
debt dynamics—and so policies that raise g 
without triggering concerns that raise r by 
even more can be especially effective in im-
proving sustainability. (Furman 2016: 7–8)
A similar point is made by Delong and 
Summers (2012) which argues that if 
there is any signifi cant hysteresis, ex-
pansionary policy can full pay for itself, 
that is, raise growth suffi cient to avoid 
any rise in the debt ratio. 
Case for Fiscal Expansion
The Furman and Delong–Summers 
approach may be equally applicable in 
 India. In a situation where we have sub-
stantial debt–GDP ratios and a weakening 
economy, it makes sense for the monetary 
authority to reduce the interest burden 
on debt by reducing the interest rate, 
and the fi scal authority to target output. 
In that sense, expanding the defi cit and 
reducing the interest rate will work to 
both increase output and to signifi cantly 
improve the debt to GDP ratio since the 
addition to debt from defi cits will be 
lower than the reduction in debt coming 
from lowered interest costs. There is 
substantial place, indeed a necessity for 
fi scal expansion and interest rate reduc-
tions if one is to achieve both the output 
target and the debt target.11
But even without looking at the ques-
tion of monetary and fi scal coordination, 
it is fairly clear that India has much more 
fi scal space than discussed in the report. 
What do the numbers discussed thus far 
suggest about the relationship between 
the target debt–ratio and the appropri-
ate fi scal stance? We can turn to equa-
tion (3) for guidance.
Given a differential between g and i of 
3%–4% from our discussion before, 
holding the current primary defi cit of 
0.9% at its level would mean that the 
debt level would mechanically converge 
to between .009/.03 and .009/.04 or bet-
ween 22.5% and 30%! This would be 
substantially lower than the required 
ceiling of 60%. Put another way, the pri-
mary defi cit could rise to roughly bet-
ween 1.8% to 2.4% given the projected 
differential between growth and inter-
est rates and still be consistent with the 
mandate for a 60% debt–GDP ratio.
Given these favourable dynamics (that 
the committee suggests will continue for 
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the foreseeable future), one might ex-
pect the committee not to suggest addi-
tional fi scal consolidation, and perhaps 
even increase spending.
The committee does not suggest this. 
Instead, given that there is no external 
bogey in terms of credit risk, we are sim-
ply told “domestic defaults happen,” and 
that infl ation is costly. The former may 
be technically true, but would only be 
the case if the state actively decided not 
to fulfi l its obligations. It might be worth 
noting that this has not happened in 
 India’s history. Nor is there any reason 
for it to occur. A basic fallacy that is com-
mon in current macroeconomics is to 
 assume that a government needs to have 
tax revenue to repay its sovereign cur-
rency denominated debt (it does not). 
The government cannot run out of rupees. 
The latter concern is a non sequitur. No 
one is suggesting engineering a high 
level of infl ation to infl ate away debt; it 
is a mechanical collateral “benefi t.”12
Given this, the report performs a 
strange pivot to justify less spending. 
This is most obvious in the otherwise sharp 
and perspicacious dissent note of Arvind 
Subramanian. Despite noting that there 
is no justifi cation for the debt ratio of 
60% and further noting that since debt 
dynamics may be favourable for spending 
and that growth will be high in the next 
decade, the dissent note should reduce
spending steadily so that if there comes 
a time when the situation becomes worse 
and headwinds arise (when i>g), then 
we will have fi scal space at that point. It 
is an opportunity to “fi x the roof when 
the sun is shining” (FRBM–RC 2017: 167). 
This is, to my view, backwards. There 
are in fact, actual roofs that need to be 
fi xed and built (the government reports 
a $1.5 trillion infrastructural defi cit over 
the next 10 years), and spending is less 
costly now than it would be when i>g, 
since then the addition to the debt ratio is 
disproportionately higher, whereas spend-
ing when g>i (as is the case currently 
and potentially for the next decade) will 
still lead to less debt accumulation. But 
this preference for lower spending is 
shared in the main report that also sug-
gested adjusting the fi scal balance down-
wards steadily over the next few years.
This is a pity, since there is no question 
that the union could do with additional 
spending in general. A critical source of 
expenditure in the country is the govern-
ment, since private investment has been 
slowing down in the face of a debt over-
hang. Indeed, if there is a danger of ex-
penditure slowing because of debt, it is 
really in the corporate sector, which has 
seen a sharp increase to about 60% of 
GDP currently (Figure 2). There is addi-
tionally increasing evidence that private 
debt may be far more destabilising than 
government debt (Jorda et al 2013; Turner 
2016). The committee report does recog-
nise these diffi culties, but does not 
 acknowledge the implications for the 
sources of demand going forward.
Additionally, there is substantial con-
cern that the country has an employment 
crisis that will make the demographic 
dividend of a youthful population a de-
mographic nightmare. Nor is there any 
evidence that we have any macroeco-
nomic overheating. There is increasing 
evidence that demand is weak as we have 
slowing wages and very moderate infl a-
tion without any monetary policy restric-
tiveness. Taken together, these suggest 
a low-pressure economy with substantial 
space for expenditure. Just as critically, 
India is woefully underspending on 
health, education, and other social sec-
tor expenditure, all of which are likely to 
crowd in private investment. If there is 
any time to undertake important ex-
penditure, it is now.
Notes
 1 This last point is increasingly well-recognised 
in the literature (Kirasanova et al 2009; Mason 
and Jayadev 2017; Ryoo and Skott 2012; Bianchi 
and Melosi 2017).
 2 For the European Union, this is 60% as well, so 
this may not be a coincidence.
 3 Having noted this, Subramanian also suggests 
that committing to reducing the primary defi cit 
steadily may be the optimal policy, though here 
again, it is unclear why the natural path should 
be towards consolidation.
 4 https://countryeconomy.com/national-debt/
india.  
 5 In a particularly telling note, the committee 
shows its general inapplicability to the real 
world. They note that the No Ponzi condition 
requires that “the sustainable level of debt 
should be less than or equal to the PDV of the 
expected future primary surpluses, where the 
discount factor is given by (r-g), where r is real 
interest rate on government debt, and g is the 
real growth rate. This methodology, however, 
is not easily adaptable to India as India has his-
torically recorded primary defi cits, which 
would imply a negative value of sustainable 
debt. Second, even the discount factor, or the 
difference between real interest and growth 
rates, has consistently been negative” (FRBM–
RC 2017: 50–51).
 6 Willem Buiter (who was consulted for the re-
port) has a wonderful sardonic take on the no-
tion of imbalance and sustainability when he 
notes: “There is a tendency in the economics 
profession to regard anything that is not indefi -
nitely sustainable—not in steady state—as an 
‘imbalance’. Following this usage, the follow-
ing would represent imbalances: any positive 
population growth rate, my life, Life on earth” 
(2008).
 7 To further caveat this statement, it is important 
to realise that, in the Indian context, infl ation is 
predominantly supply led rather than demand 
led (Balakrishnan 2017).
 8 Moreover, the stability properties are interest-
ing. If g > i, the equilibrium is stable but if 
g < i,  it is unstable and  if the debt is one rupee 
too high, it will rise without limit; if it is one 
rupee too low, it will fall without limit.
 9 Puzzlingly, the committee report recognises 
these diffi culties but give it short shrift. As they 
note, “the debt to GDP ratio can be impacted by 
factors outside the policymaker’s control—eg, 
interest and exchange rates. Furthermore, it 
can also be impacted by “below-the-line” items 
that don’t necessarily fl ow through the budget. 
So the link between annual primary balances 
(the variable most directly under the control of 
policymakers) and the debt to GDP is not al-
ways direct” (FRBM–RC 2017: 34). 
10  The report recognises this: “In extreme situa-
tions, in fact, focusing on a debt target can 
cause fi scal policy to become pro-cyclical. For 
example, a negative shock to GDP causes the 
debt to GDP to rise. If the debt to GDP ratio was 
already as its limit/ceiling before the shock, 
the primary balance would need to increase (or 
the primary defi cit be reduced) to improve debt 
dynamics, thereby making fi scal policy pro-
cyclical. But this is only the case when the debt
Figure 2: Private Non-financial Sector Debt as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product
Source: Bank for international Settlements (BIS).
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to GDP ratio is at its ceiling” (FRBM–RC 2017: 
34). The extreme situation, of course, is now.
11  Another important concern is that there may 
be no “shovel ready projects.” It is clear that 
states are not taking up and disbursing alloca-
tions effi ciently and that actual demand could 
increase if this was the case. I am grateful to 
Rathin Roy for specifying this point.
12 Infl ation did the most to reduce debt in the US 
and other countries after the war till the debt 
build-up beginning in the 1980s (Reinhart and 
Sbrancia 2015). 
References
Ash, M, D Basu and A Dube (2017): “Public Debt 
and Growth: An Assessment of Key Findings on 
Causality and Thresholds,” UMass Amherst 
Economics Working Papers 226. 
Azizi, Karim et al (2012): “Are No-Ponzi Game and 
Transversality Conditions Relevant for Public 
Debt? A Keynesian Appraisal,” Political Econo-
my Research Institute, Working Paper 296. 
Balakrishnan, Pulapre (2017): “The Reserve Bank Is 
Off Target,” Hindu, 1 August.
Bianchi, F and L Melosi (2017): “The Dire Effects of 
the Lack of Monetary and Fiscal Coordination,” 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Work-
ing Paper 23605. 
Buiter, Willem (2008): “Global Imbalances? What 
Global Imbalances?” willembuiter.com/imbal-
ances.ppt.
Chakravarty, Manas (2017): “The Perils of a Fiscal 
Stimulus,” Mint, 26 September. 
DeLong, J B and L H Summers (2012): “Fiscal Policy 
in a Depressed Economy,” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, Brookings Institution, Vol 43, 
No 1, pp 233–297.
DeLong, B (2015): “Rethinking Macroeconomics,” 
Equitablog, 5 April, http://equitablegrowth.
org/equitablog/draft-rethinking-macroeco-
nomics-conference-fi scal-policy-panel/. 
FRBM–RC (2017): FRBM Review Committee Report 
Volume 1—Responsible Growth: A Debt and 
 Fiscal Framework for 21st Century India, 
Depart ment of Economic Affairs, Government 
of India. 
Furman, J (2016): “The New View of Fiscal Policy 
and Its Application,” Obama White House 
Background Paper, https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/sites/default/fi les/page/
fi les/20161005_furman_suerf_fi scal_policy_
cea.pdf.
Gandhi, M K (1928): Young India, 15 November, 
p 381.
Hall, G J and T Sargent (2011): “Interest Rate Risk 
and Other Determinants of Post-WWII US 
Government Debt/GDP Dynamics,” American 
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol 3, No 3, 
pp 192–214. 
IMF (2017):  “India: Selected Issues,” IMF Country 
Report No 17/55, International Monetary Fund, 
https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publica-
tions/CR/2017/cr1755.ashx.
Jordà, Ò et al (2013): “When Credit Bites 
Back,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 
Vol 45, No s2, pp 3–28.
Kirsanova, T et al (2009): “Monetary and Fiscal 
Policy Interaction: The Current Consensus Assign-
ment in the Light of Recent Developments,” 
Economic Journal, Vol 119, No 541, pp F482–F496. 
Mason, J W and A Jayadev (2017): A Comparison of 
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction under 
“Sound” and “Functional” Finance Regimes, 
mimeo.
Reinhart, C M and K S Rogoff (2010): “Growth in a 
Time of Debt,” American Economic Review, 
Vol 100, No 2, pp 573–78. 
Reinhart, C M and M B Sbrancia (2015): “The Liqui-
dation of Government Debt,” Economic Policy, 
Vol 30, No 82, pp 291–333. 
Ryoo, S and P Skott (2012): “Fiscal and Monetary 
Policy Rules in an Unstable Economy,” Metro-
economica, Vol 68, No 3, pp 500–48. 
Turner, Adair (2016): Between Debt and the Dev-
il: Money, Credit, and Fixing Global Finance, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
